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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Donald Houser was found guilty by a jury of aggravated assault. The victim, his 
younger brother Douglas "Doogie" Houser, 1 petitioned the district court for a restitution 
award for his wages for various days. While the district court did not grant the entirety 
of his request, it did provide awards for one day that Doogie took off because he was 
emotionally distressed, as well as for several days where Doogie made the choice to 
attend court hearings rather than go to work. His employer told him that each such 
decision would require him to take a full day off work. These awards are not authorized 
by the restitution statute, I. C. § 19-5304, and therefore, should be vacated. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The State charged Mr. Houser with aggravated assault, alleging he threatened 
Doogie by pulling a knife on him. (R., p.28.) Mr. Houser exercised his right to a jury 
trial. (See, e.g., R., pp.63-80.) Despite the testimony of numerous witnesses who had 
seen Mr. Houser on the day in question and affirmatively testified that he was not 
wearing the knife identified by Doogie (see, e.g., Tr., Vol.2, p.151, Ls.2-21 )2 , the jury 
found Mr. Houser guilty of the offense. (R., p.88.) The district court sentenced 
Mr. Houser to a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed. (R., pp.99-100.) 
1 To promote clarity, Donald Houser will be referred to as "Mr. Houser" and his brother 
will be referred to as "Doogie." 
2 The transcripts in this case are contained in four independently bound and paginated 
volumes. To promote clarity, the volume containing the Motion in Limine hearing held 
on January 23, 2012, et al., will be referred to as "Vol.1." The volume containing the 
trial proceedings from February 13 and February 14, 2012, will be referred to as "Vol.2." 
The volume containing the April 23, 2012, sentencing hearing will be referred to as 
"Vol.3." The volume containing the transcript from the August 31, 2011, bond reduction 
hearing will be referred to as "Vol.4." 
1 
Mr. Houser filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the judgment of conviction. 
(R., pp.105-06.) 
Doogie also filed an affidavit for restitution in the amount of $1, 102.40. 3 
(Augmentation Affidavit for Restitution.) He attached a letter to that affidavit from his 
employer, which indicated that Doogie had missed 106 hours of work due to the incident 
with Mr. Houser and that Doogie was paid $10.40 per hour. (Augmentation - Affidavit 
for Restitution.) At the restitution hearing, Doogie presented another document in which 
he broke down his request by each day of work he missed and the number of hours 
missed that day.4 (Tr., Vol.1, p.168, Ls.14-17.) That document was identified as State's 
Exhibit 1 and was admitted into evidence. (Tr., Vol.1, p.168, L.18 - p:169, L.18.) 
The district court only awarded the amounts requested by Doogie for August 22, 
August 23, 2011, August 31, 2011, September 6, 2011, September 12, 2011, 
November 14, 2011, December 12, 2011, January 23, 2012, February 14, 2012, and 
February 15, 2012. 5 (Tr., Vol.1, p.187, L.6 - p.188, L.9.) Accordingly, it entered an 
3 The district court initially entered a restitution order for that amount. (R., pp.96-97.) 
Mr. Houser filed a timely objection to that order and the matter was scheduled for a 
hearing. (R., pp.109-10.) 
4 According to Doogie, his work schedule changed based on the season, meaning that 
for some of the dates in question, he was scheduled for a ten-hour shift, while on other 
dates, he was only scheduled for an eight-hour shift. (Tr., Vol.1, p.175, Ls.9-13.) 
5 Doogie also tried to claim restitution for a hearing held on September 26, 2011, in 
regard to a related civil protection order case in which Mr. Hauser's wife filed for a 
protection order against Doogie as a result of these same events. (Augmentation -
State's Exhibit 1; Tr., Vol.1, p.174, L.20 - p.175, L.4.) Doogie admitted that those 
proceedings were not actually part of Mr. Hauser's criminal case. (Tr., Vol.1, p.179, 
Ls.3-14.) The district court did not award that requested restitution. (Tr., Vol.1, p.187, 
Ls.24-25.) He also claimed restitution for August 24, 2011, and August 25, 2011, 
because Doogie was claiming restitution on those dates as a result of being 
"Emotionally Shaken" and sore. (Augmentation - State's Exhibit 1; Tr., Vol.1, p.171, 
L.20 - p.172, L.12.) The district court did not award restitution for those two dates 
either, holding that "if there was any kind of physical discomfort, it wasn't a result of the 
charged conduct in this case, and I'm not allowed to consider emotional distress." 
(Tr., p.187, Ls.17-22.) 
2 
amended restitution order for $936.00. (R., pp.113-14.) However, Mr. Houser had 
challenged most of those awards on several grounds. First, as to the August 22, 2011, 
claim, Mr. Houser had requested restitution for his wages that day because he was 
"Emotionally Shaken." (Augmentation State's Exhibit 1.) Doogie added that he had 
also taken the day off because he was "too sore" to perform his duties. (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.172, Ls.11-12.) Mr. Houser challenged that claim because the restitution statute did 
not authorize awards for emotional distress damages and, because no contact had 
been made during the relevant encounter,6 the soreness could not be attributed to 
Mr. Hauser's culpable actions (pulling of a knife as a threat to do harm). (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.183, L.13 - p.184, L.16.) The district court, however, found that his assertion that he 
was emotionally distressed because Mr. Houser had not yet been arrested to be 
reasonable, and so ordered an award for that date. (Tr., Vol.1, p.187, Ls.6-10.) 
Mr. Houser had challenged the awards for August 23, 2011, August 31, 2011, 
September 6, 2011, September 12, 2011, November 14, 2011, December 12, 2011, 
and January 23, 2012, based on the fact that Doogie's presence was not required at 
those hearings and they only took a very small portion of the day, so he would have 
otherwise been able to return to work on those days. (Tr., Vol.1, p.182, L.6 - p.183, 
L.10.) Doogie's explanation of why he did not return to work was that he had to drive 
twenty-three miles each way from his job site, 7 so his employer told him if he was going 
6 The State presented evidence of a confrontation which occurred at Mr. Hauser's 
mother's house earlier in the day, but which had no bearing on whether Mr. Houser 
threatened Doogie with a knife at Doogie's house at a different time. (See, e.g., 
Tr., Vol.2, p.82, Ls.10-19.) 
7 Of interesting note, though not presented to the district court, is the fact that Google 
Maps estimates the distance from the Washington County Courthouse in Weiser to 
Doogie's place of employment (see Augmentation - Letter from Chet Slyter 
accompanying Affidavit of Restitution) to be only eleven and one-half miles. Google 
Maps, http://maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&tab=wl (requesting driving directions from 
3 
to those hearings, he should just take the entire day off. (Tr., Vol.1, p.173, Ls.8-20.) 
The minutes of those hearings indicate that they took seven minutes (R., p.16), four 
minutes (R., p.21), ten minutes (see R., pp.25-26), seventeen minutes (R., p.31), four 
minutes (R., pp.37-38), six minutes (R., p.43), and eight minutes (R., p.48) 
respectively. 8 Mr. Houser did not object to the award of full day's wages for Doogie's 
appearance at the trial on February 14, 2012, and February 15, 2012. (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.183, Ls.11-12.) He also did not object to four other, unattributed hours of wages. 
(See Tr., Vol.1, p.184, Ls.17-18 (indicating no objection to an award of twenty hours' 
worth of wages); Augmentation State's Exhibit 1 (indicating the times claimed for the 
trial dates were eight hours each). 
Doogie also admitted that his presence was not required on these dates, and he 
only attended so as "to keep up to date on the hearings." (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.178, 
L.19 - p.179, L.2.) Defense counsel argued that, since Doogie's presence was not 
required, the decision to be present at the hearings was optional, and therefore, not 
claimable as restitution. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.182, Ls.6-17.) Defense counsel also 
argued that any restitution award should be limited to just the time that Doogie actually 
spent in the hearing. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.182, L.19.) However, the district court 
"256 East Court Street Weiser, ID 83672" to "Thousand Springs Ranch, 1860 U.S. 95, 
Weiser, ID 83672") (last accessed January 16, 2012) (copy of image of map on file with 
counsel). 
8 Accordingly, the record indicates Doogie would have spent a total of fifty-six minutes in 
all these hearings. He indicated, however, that on some occasions, he might have 
spent up to one hour at the courthouse on those dates. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.177, 
L.24 - p.178, L.2 (admitting spending only one hour at the courthouse on August 31, 
2011); Tr., Vol.1, p.178, Ls.7-14 (admitting to spending only one-half hour in the 
courtroom on September 6, 2011 ).) Contrarily, as to the hearing on November 14, 
2011, Doogie could not even affirmatively remember attending that hearing, nor could 
he dispute defense counsel's assertion that other people could not remember him being 
present on that date. (Tr., Vol.1, p.179, L.23 - p.180, L.4.) 
4 
rejected those arguments and awarded restitution for a full day's wage on all those 
dates, as well as for August 22, 2011. (Tr., Vol.1, p.187, L.6 - p.188, L.9.) 
Mr. Houser filed a timely amended Notice of Appeal following the district court's 
amended restitution order. (R., pp.116-17.) 
5 
ISSUE 
Whether the district court exceeded its statutory authority when it ordered Mr. Houser to 
pay restitution for losses which were not the result of his criminal conduct, and for 
losses which were claimed for emotional distress. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Exceeded Its Statutory Authority When It Ordered Mr. Houser To Pay 
Restitution For Losses Which Were Not The Result Of His Criminal Conduct, And For 
Losses Which Were Claimed For Emotional Distress 
A Introduction 
This Court should vacate the restitution award in this case because the awards 
made are not authorized by the restitution statute. The award improperly covers losses 
which were not caused by Mr. Hauser's culpable actions, but rather, were due to 
optional choices made by Doogie. Restitution only allows for recoupment of losses 
directly and proximately caused by a defendant's culpable actions, and losses due to 
optional choices are not so caused. The award also includes losses for emotional 
distress, which is forbidden by Idaho law. Because of these errors, this Court should 
vacate the restitution award in this case, or alternatively, remand the case for a proper 
calculation of restitution. 
B. There Is No Statutory Authority For The Damages Not Caused By Mr. Hauser's 
Criminal Conduct, Notably, The Wages Lost Because Of Doogie's Optional 
Choice To Attend Hearings Rather Than Go To Work 
Restitution under the Idaho Code permits the court to "order a defendant found 
guilty of any crime which results in an economic loss to the victim to make restitution to 
the victim."9 l.C. § 19-5304(2). The definition of economic loss does specifically include 
"lost wages." l.C. §19-5304(1)(a). A "victim" is "a person or entity, who suffers 
9 However, as will be discussed infra, to make an award for any of the listed economic 
losses, the loss must be proximately caused by the defendant's culpable action, and 
Mr. Harper is asserting that many of the lost wages claimed in this case were not 
proximately caused by his culpable actions. 
7 
economic loss or injury as the result of the defendant's criminal conduct."10 
l.C. § 19-5304(1)(e)(i) (emphasis added). "[A] victim may be compensated for losses or 
expenses incurred in attending the restitution hearing and other criminal proceedings."11 
State v. Parker, 143 Idaho 165, 167 (Ct. App. 2006). However, in order to get such 
awards, the loss must still be caused by the defendant's criminal conduct. 
l.C. § 19-5304(1 )(e)(i); see, e.g., State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 37 (Ct. App. 2002). 
"Criminal conduct" is limited only to those actions for which the defendant is found 
guilty. State v. Shafer, 144 Idaho 370, 373 (Ct. App. 2007). In some cases in this area, 
the term "culpable act" is substituted for "criminal conduct." See e.g. State v. Lampien, 
148 Idaho 367, 374 (2007). A defendant may be ordered to pay additional restitution if 
he agrees to pay such restitution as part of a plea deal. Shafer, 144 Idaho at 373 (citing 
l.C. § 19-5304(9)). A determination of restitution by the trial court is reviewed for abuse 
of discretion. Richmond, 137 Idaho at 37. 
To order restitution without an agreement by the parties, a court must have 
statutory authority permitting the order. Id. ·Idaho statutes limit the court's authority in 
this respect to only the damages caused by the conduct for which the defendant has 
been convicted. Id. at 38 (citing Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 420 (1990)); 
see also Shafer, 144 Idaho at 372; State v. Schultz, 148 Idaho 884, 886-87 (Ct. App. 
2008); State v. Auberl, 119 Idaho 868, 870 (Ct. App. 1991 ), overruled on other grounds 
by State v. Dorsey, 126 Idaho 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1995). Furthermore, economic loss is 
limited to only the "necessary expenses or losses that the victim incurred in order to 
10 There are other definitions of "victim" under this section which are inapplicable to this 
case. See l.C. § 19-5304(1)(e). 
11 The term "must" establishes a mandatory duty to act in a certain manner, whereas 
"may" would authorize, but not require, the proscribed action. Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 
841, 848 (1995). 
8 
address the consequences of the criminal conduct. It does not follow, however, that 
restitution may be ordered ... for any out-of-pocket expense that the victim would not 
have incurred but for the defendant's crime." Parker, 143 Idaho at 168 (emphasis in 
original). Where the victim spends money that is not necessary to address the effects 
of the conduct, but rather, is merely optional costs incurred in response to the conduct, 
restitution is not authorized. Id.; see also State v. Waidelich, 140 Idaho 622, 624 
(Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the victim's optional decision to increase the protection to 
her property was not a result of the defendant's criminal conduct of burglary, and 
therefore, those costs were not recoverable as restitution); State v. Card, 146 Idaho 
111, 114 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding optional medical treatments, which had not shown to 
be necessary to treat the injuries caused by the defendant's criminal conduct, were not 
properly recoverable as restitution). 
To determine whether restitution is authorized under the statute, Idaho employs 
the tort law causation analysis. Lampien, 148 Idaho at 374; State v. Nienburg, 
153 Idaho 491, 495-96 (Ct. App. 2012), reh'g denied. Causation has two parts: actual 
cause and proximate cause. State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602 (2011 ). Actual cause 
is determined using the "but for" test. Id. On the other hand, proximate cause is 
determined by using the "reasonably foreseeable" test. Id. The reasonably foreseeable 
test requires the court to determine "whether the injury and manner of occurrence are 
'so highly unusual . . . that a reasonable [person], making an inventory of the 
possibilities of harm which his conduct might produce, would not have reasonably 
expected the injury to occur."' Lampien, 148 Idaho at 374 (quoting Cramer v. Slater, 
146 Idaho 868, 875 (2009)). When the injury and manner of occurrence are so highly 
unusual that they are not reasonably foreseeable, they constitute an intervening, 
9 
superseding cause. An intervening, superseding cause is "an independent act or force 
that breaks the causal chain between the defendant's culpable act and the victim's 
injury." Id. It replaces the defendant's act as the proximate cause and relieves him of 
liability, so long as the intervening, superseding cause is unforeseeable and 
extraordinary. Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602. 
In this case, there were several losses claimed by Doogie and for which a 
restitution award was entered that were not caused by Mr. Hauser's culpable act, but 
rather, were optional costs. For example, Mr. Houser challenged the claims 
Doogie made for the days he attended court but was not required to be there. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.182, L.4 - p.184, L.18.) Such losses, unlike the losses he incurred for 
February 14, 2012, and February 15, 2012, when he testified at the trial, were not 
necessary to address the consequences of Mr. Hauser's culpable acts. Compare 
State v. Russell, 126 Idaho 38, 39 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding a victim may claim lost 
wages for the days he was required to be in court and testify about the losses); State v. 
Doe, 140 Idaho 873, 880-81 (Ct. App. 2004), abrogated on other grounds recognized by 
State v. Hooper, Not Reported in P.3d, Docket Number 31025, p.2 n.3 (Ct. App. 2006) 
(holding that the parents of a victim who had to accompany their child to hearings could 
recover wages for those losses, particularly since the defendant did not cross-examine 
them about their calculations in that regard); State v. Olpin, 140 Idaho 377, 379 
(Ct. App. 2004) (allowing restitution for the wages of employees who had to stop their 
normal work to investigate the extent of the impact of the defendant's actions on the 
corporate victim and who provided testimony in court about those damages). Notably, 
by his own admission, Doogie was not subpoenaed to be at the hearings held on 
September 6, 2011, (Tr., Vol.1, p.17 4, Ls.2-10), and December 12, 2011, (Tr., Vol.1, 
10 
p.180, Ls.5-14). He also admitted that he was either not required, or could not 
remember being required, to be at the hearings on September 12, 201 ·1, (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.178, Ls.19-25) and January 23, 2012, (Tr., Vol.1, p.180, Ls.15-17), but rather wanted 
to be there so as to keep tabs on the court schedule for the case. 12 (See, e.g., 
Tr., Vol.1, p.180, Ls.9-11.) 
Furthermore, apart from testifying that he could not remember being required to 
be present for the hearing on November 14, 2011, Doogie could not affirmatively testify 
that he even attended that hearing, nor could he refute defense counsel's 
representation that other people did not remember him being present that day. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.178, L.16 - p.179, L.4.) He also did not offer any testimony in regard to 
the bond hearing held on August 31, 2011, much less whether his presence was 
necessary at that time, and yet he claimed ten hours of lost wages. (See generally 
Tr., Vol.4; Tr., Vol.1, p.167, L.23 - p.181, L.23.) The record also belies Doogie's 
assertion that he had to be at the magistrate court arraignment hearing on August 23, 
2011, so as to testify in regard to bond (though he admitted he was not certain that he 
had actually testified on that date, and not another date). 13 (Tr., Vol.1, p.177, Ls.11-19.) 
The minutes from the August 23, 2011, hearing do not indicate any testimony given by 
any witness, and in regard to bond, only indicated that the prosecutor made argument. 
(R., p.16.) 
12 This goal could have also been accomplished by simply reviewing the Idaho 
judiciary's online repository, rather than taking a full day off work to attend the short 
hearings. See Idaho State Judiciary, "Idaho Supreme Court Data Repository," 
https://www.idcourts.us/repository/start.do. 
13 Mr. Houser was called to testify at that hearing. (Tr., Vol.4, p.5, Ls.14-22.) He was 
the only person to offer testimony at that hearing, as the State did not have any 
witnesses to offer testimony. (Tr., Vol.4, p.10, L.25 - p.11, L.1; see generally Tr., Vol.4.) 
Neither the transcript nor the minutes from that hearing indicate that Doogie was 
present at that hearing. (See generally R., pp.21-22, Tr., Vol.4.) 
11 
Therefore, by the evidence given by Doogie himself, his attendance at the 
hearings on August 31, 2011, September 6, 2011, September 12, 2011, November 14, 
2011, 14 December 12, 2011, and January 23, 2012, was optional. 15 As such, the 
expenses claimed for his optional choices on those dates were not caused by 
Mr. Houser's culpable conduct, and therefore, they should be vacated from the 
restitution order. See Parker, 143 Idaho at 167-68; Waidelich, 140 Idaho at 624; Card, 
146 Idaho at 114-17. And even if losses of Doogie's time in the courtroom at those 
hearings were caused by Mr. Hauser's culpable actions, the fact that Doogie took the 
remainder of the day off was not, in any way, caused by Mr. Houser's culpable act. In 
that case, the award should only reflect the time that Doogie was in the courtroom for 
the actual hearing, not the entire day. 
Notably, many of those hearings actually took very little time. For example, on 
August 31, for which the district court awarded ten hours of wages, only one hour of 
Doogie's day, by his own admission, was spent in the courtroom. 16 (Tr., Vol.1, p.177, 
L.24 - p.178, L.2; Augmentation - State's Exhibit 1 (Doogie's itemized claim for 
restitution).) He also received ten hours of wages for his time on August 23, 2011, for 
the magistrate court arraignment hearing. (Tr., Vol.1, p.187, Ls.11-16; Augmentation -
14 As Doogie could not testify that he had actually been present at the November 14, 
2011, hearing, there is no evidence demonstrating that this loss was, in any way, 
related to Mr. Houser's culpable conduct. Therefore, there is no statutory basis at all for 
the award for Doogie's wages for that day. See l.C. § 19-5304. As such, it, at least, 
should be vacated. 
15 While Doogie, as the victim of the crime, may have had the right to attend these 
hearings, IDAHO CONST. Art.I, § 22; l.C. §19-5306, his exercise of that right was not 
required, particularly when his employer told him that choosing to do so would result in 
a loss of a full day's wages. The restitution statute does not provide for recovery for 
losses caused by the optional exercise of a right. See l.C. § 19-5304; Parker, 143 
Idaho at 167-68; Waidelich, 140 Idaho at 624; Card, 146 Idaho at 114-17. 
16 The hearing itself only took thirteen minutes. (R., p.21.) 
12 
State's Exhibit 1.) That proceeding took seven minutes. (R., p.16.) Again, Doogie 
received restitution for ten hours for September 6, 2011. (Tr., Vol.1, p.187, L.25 
p.188, L.5; Augmentation - State's Exhibit 1.) However, he only spent, by his own 
admission, one-half of an hour in the courtroom on that day. (Tr., Vol.1, p.178, Ls.7-14.) 
The hearing itself only lasted approximately ten minutes. (See R., pp.25-26.) 
The same is true for September 12, 2011, when Doogie attended Mr. Hauser's 
felony arraignment, taking the whole day off work "to keep up to date on the hearings." 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.178, L.19 - p.179, L.2; Augmentation - State's Exhibit 1.) However, the 
minutes of that hearing reflect that Mr. Hauser's felony arraignment took a total of 
seventeen minutes. (R., p.31.) Doogie claimed eight hours of wages for December 12, 
2011, and January 23, 2012, when he claimed to have attended hearings to keep tabs 
on the court's schedule. (Tr., Vol.1, p.180, Ls.5-17.) Those hearings took six minutes 
and eight minutes, respectively. (R., pp.43, 48.) Yet, for those fourteen minutes of his 
time, Doogie received an award for sixteen hours of wages. (Tr. Vol.1, p.187, L.25 -
p.188, L.5.) 
Therefore, as evidenced by the record and Doogie's own admissions, most of 
these hearings took less than one hour, meaning Doogie might have been personally 
able to work for a portion of the day. The only justification for his decision to not return 
to work was the fact that Doogie had to drive to and from the courthouse, and so his 
employer told him to take the remainder of those days off. (Tr., p.173, Ls.8-16.) 
However, the employer's permission to take the entire day off constitutes an 
intervening, superseding cause in regard to whether Mr. Hauser's actions caused those 
losses - it was not foreseeable that the employer would not require a partial day of 
work, particularly since Doogie was not spending extraordinary amounts of time in the 
13 
courthouse. As such, those losses were not proximately caused by Mr. Houser, and 
thus, not properly awarded as restitution. See Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602. Additionally, 
as explained supra, Doogie did not have to attend those hearings, and so his choice to 
miss work, allowed by his supervisor, may not be awarded under the restitution statute. 
See l.C. § 19-5304. 
Cumulatively, Doogie received a restitution award for sixty-four hours of his time 
in exchange for spending fifty-six minutes of actual time at various court hearings. Even 
Doogie's estimation of the total time he spent in the courtroom for some of these 
hearings reveals he would have only spent a few hours, all told, at these hearings, not 
full days. Therefore, the restitution awards for Doogie's wages on those dates were not 
authorized by the statute. Therefore, those portions of the restitution award should be 
stricken from the restitution order. 17 
C. There Is No Statutory Authority For The Damages For Emotional Distress 
Notably, restitution may only be awarded for "economic loss," and that term 
includes "the value of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, lost 
wages, and direct out-of-pocket losses or expenses, such as medical expenses 
resulting from the criminal conduct." Nienburg, 153 Idaho at 812 (quoting 
l.C. § 19-5304(1)(a)). Awards for less tangible damages, such as emotional distress 
damages, are expressly excluded by the restitution statute. State v. Straub, _ Idaho 
_, 2013 Opinion No.2, p.8 (January 7, 2013) (citing l.C. § 19-5304(1)(a)). As such, 
17 Sixteen hours of wages were properly awarded for Doogie's time at Mr. Heuser's trial. 
(See Augmentation - State's Exhibit 1.) Based on the implication of defense counsel's 
assertion that twenty hours of wages were all that were appropriate, Doogie spent a 
total of four hours at those hearings. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.184, Ls.17-18.) For those 
twenty hours, then, the restitution award should have been only $208.00. (See 
Augmentation - State's Exhibit 1.) 
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restitution may not be awarded for emotional distress, even if the distress was 
"rationally related to the crime." State v. Gonzales, 144 Idaho 775, 778-79 (Ct App. 
2007). Doogie claimed thirty hours of lost wages for August 22, 2011, August 24, 2011, 
and August 25, 2011, because he was "Emotionally Shaken."18 (Augmentation -
State's Exhibit 1.) The district court disallowed restitution awards for August 24, 2011, 
and August 25, 2011. (Tr., Vol.1, p.187, Ls.17-22.) However, it did allow for ten hours 
of wages for August 22, 2011. (Tr., Vol.1, p.187, Ls.6-10.) The only difference between 
Doogie's claim for emotional distress damages on August 22, 2011, was that 
Mr. Houser was not in custody on August 22, 2011. (Augmentation - State's Exhibit 1.) 
The district court found that to be "reasonable," and so ordered the award for August 22, 
2011. (Tr., Vol.1, p.187, Ls.6-10.) However, the statute is clear: emotional distress 
damages, suffered for whatever reason, no matter how closely related to the culpable 
action, and no matter how reasonable, are not recoverable as restitution. 
l.C. § 19-5304(1)(a); Straub, 2013 Opinion No.2, p.8; Gonzales, 144 Idaho at 778-79. 
Therefore, the award for Doogie's wages on August 22 should be vacated as well. 
18 He also claimed that he was "too sore to lift or bend or any of that." (Tr., p.172, 
Ls.11-12.) However, at the trial, he admitted on cross-examination that he could not 
remember ever being touched during the incident from which the criminal charge arose. 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.99, Ls.13-15.) As such, as the district court found, there is no way that 
Mr. Hauser's culpable conduct could have caused Doogie to be sore, and so restitution 
on that basis is not authorized by the restitution statute. (Tr., Vol.1, p.187, Ls.17-22.) 
15 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Houser respectfully requests this Court vacate the restitution order in his 
case. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a 
new restitution hearing. 
DATED this 18th day of April, 201 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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